



# Alethic and Logical Pluralism

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There are two main objectives. One is to provide a unified framework for thinking about pluralisms with respect to truth and pluralisms with respect to logic—alethic and logical pluralism. It is tempting to think that there is a single underlying pluralism that gets applied in these two different cases, but I think that is wrong. The alethic pluralists are, for the most, working with one model, and the logical pluralists are working with a different model. There are exceptions in each case but the dominant views are distinct. I want to try to bring out this difference and think about which of these versions is more plausible.

The second objective is to use the version of pluralism that I think is more plausible to describe a view on the truth paradoxes I have been defending lately. And then use it again to formulate a position on the paradoxes that would be a rival to the one that I have advocated. It seems

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like this view I will present would be a better than my own view. I defend this rival view a bit and then argue that it is actually not a better approach to the paradoxes.

## 1 Pluralisms

Roy Cook writes: “One is a *pluralist* about a particular phenomenon X iff one thinks that there is more than one correct account of X” (Cook 2010: 493). Cook then defines logical pluralism as “[T]here is more than one ‘correct’, ‘best’, or ‘legitimate’ logic” (Cook 2010: 492), and Gillian Russell offers something very similar: “[T]here is more than one correct logic” (Russell 2016: 1).

On the other hand, *alethic* pluralism has been defined by Pedersen and Wright as “[T]here is more than one way of being true” (Pedersen and Wright 2013: 1) and in Pedersen “There are several properties ... in virtue of which propositions are true” (Pedersen 2012: 1) and “What property makes propositions true may vary across domains or from subject matter to subject matter” (Pedersen and Wright 2013: 2).

Given these kinds of quotations it is tempting to think that there is just one kind of pluralism that then is applied in various ways. In a moment it will be clear why that is a mistake.

I am not going to go through all the specific instances of logical pluralism or alethic pluralism. However, under the logical pluralists, I am thinking of Beall and Restall of course but then also those like Roy Cook and Stewart Shapiro who think of model theories as scientific models. And there is Gillian Russell’s version of logical pluralism and Hartry Field’s version as well.<sup>1</sup> Under the alethic pluralism banner is of course Crispin Wright’s pioneering work and then different ways of developing it by Edwards, Lynch, Pedersen, and Ulatowski.<sup>2</sup>

## 2 Contexts, Domains, and Pluralisms

I want to think about the relationship between these two patches of literature: alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. The first comparison is that in the alethic pluralism literature emphasizes the difference between

moderate pluralism and strong pluralism.<sup>3</sup> A moderate alethic pluralist says that, in addition to the domain-specific truth properties, there is a truth-as-such property; a strong alethic pluralist denies that. This difference is not as significant in the logical pluralism literature, and one of the things that I want to do is think about applying this distinction across board.<sup>4</sup> But before we can do that we have to get straight on one other more important comparison.

The second comparison is domains versus contexts. This is a crucial distinction that gets overlooked in each literature. There is a temptation to think that this does not really matter. However, the distinction underlies two fundamentally different kinds of pluralism, and this is why these are not just two applications of a single model of pluralism.

Thinking about domains is common in the truth pluralism literature, while thinking about context is common in the logical pluralism literature.<sup>5</sup> It is a standard in discussions of alethic pluralism to posit distinct domains of discourse and assume that each proposition belongs to only one domain and that each domain has its own truth property. Propositions might have multiple truth properties, but not in any interesting way. For example, there is no sense in which there are multiple incompatible standards relevant to determining whether a particular proposition is true. Hence, it could be that 'the earth is round' has multiple different truth properties. It is correspondence true and it is also coherence true, and you could think of other kinds of truth properties it might have as well. But because that proposition belongs to the correspondence domain, there is no sense in which the other truth properties really make much difference. In particular, if we were going to define *truth as such*, the fact that 'the earth is round' has some other truth property is not going to figure into that proposition being in the extension of *truth as such*. What matters is that the proposition has correspondence truth and it belongs to the correspondence domain. Call this the *domain approach to pluralism*.

On the other hand, in discussions of logical pluralism, it is not standard to assume that there are domains or to assume the domain specificity of arguments and consequence relations. (I am going to take validity, entailment and logical consequence to be so tightly related that if one is a pluralist about one of them then one is going to be a pluralist about the others.) Although there have been a number of recent discussions of domain-specific logical pluralism, it is a new development.<sup>6</sup> In Beall and

Restall (2006), there is no talk about domains (other than domains of quantification). They never say that some argument is valid because it belongs to a particular domain and there is a specific property of logical consequence that is appropriate for that domain. That is not the view. Their view is a global view. The idea is that logical consequence is unsettled in a certain sense. It can be sharpened up in various ways. We can in one context of discussion sharpen it in one way, just like ‘rich’ or any other unsettled notion. We can sharpen it in various ways in different conversations for different purposes, and that I am going to call the *context approach*.

You might be skeptical that the domain approach and the context approach are really two distinct approaches, so I want to say a little bit to bring out what I think are deep differences here. One way of bringing out the contrast is to notice that according to a common alethic pluralism, when ‘P is true’ is uttered, the truth property ascribed depends on the domain of P. On a common logical pluralism, however, when ‘A is valid’ is uttered, the extension of ‘valid’ depends on the context of utterance. That is, the interests of those engaged in the conversation.

For the pluralist appealing to domains (common with respect to truth), the relevant standard for an ascription is determined by the targets domain, the target being whatever is called true. The *target’s* domain is what determines the standard of truth. But for the context pluralist (common with respect to logic), the relevant standard for an ascription is determined by the *utterer’s* context. Those are quite different. We can use the analogy from a contemporary epistemology to clarify this point.

In contemporary epistemology, there’s a debate that continues to rage about the semantic features of the word ‘knows’. In this debate, one faction calls themselves ‘subject sensitive invariantists’.<sup>7</sup> They think that when I say ‘S knows that P’, whether S knows that P might depend on various standards in play but if I am a subject sensitive invariantist, the standards that are in play are the ones that are in play *for S*, the subject that I am talking about—the target of my ascription.

For an epistemological contextualist, on the other hand, there might be multiple standards in play that determine whether a particular true belief counts as knowledge.<sup>8</sup> For an epistemological contextualist, when someone asserts that S knows that P, the relevant epistemic standards are

those used in the conversation, that is, in the speaker's context of utterance. The domain approach is analogous to subject sensitive invariantism in the epistemological debate, and the context approach is analogous to contextualism in the epistemological debate. Keeping these two views separate has been thought to be essential to progress in epistemology. Hopefully those working on pluralism can see the domain vs context divide as equally important.

It is striking because these two pluralist traditions have developed somewhat independently of one another. For the most part, the truth pluralists have been working with one model, the domain approach, and the logical pluralists are working with a different model, the context approach.

With that point made, we can return to the contrast between moderate pluralism and strong pluralism as long as we keep the underlying domain/context distinction in mind. If we adhere to the domain approach, we can formulate a moderate logical pluralism in the following way: argument *A* is *valid-as-such* if and only if *A* belongs to domain 1 and *A* is *valid*<sub>1</sub> or *A* belongs to domain 2 and *A* is *valid*<sub>2</sub> or ... However, if we adhere to the context approach, it is not obvious how to formulate a moderate logical pluralism. One problem is that, on a context approach, arguments are not confined to a unique context. A single argument might be valid in one context and invalid in another.

For what it is worth, I think the context approach is preferable because of the implausibility of disjoint domains for truth bearers. As anyone who is familiar with the alethic pluralism debate can attest, the literature is filled with attempts to solve mixing problems, and that is a direct consequence of assuming the domain approach.<sup>9</sup> If one does not assume the domain approach and instead assumes the context approach, then these sorts of mixing problems never arise.

For another reason to prefer the context approach, consider a common motivation for logical pluralism: paraconsistent logic is good for databases that might have inconsistent information. This motivation might go back to one of the important papers in that this tradition is Nuel Belnap's 'How a Computer Should Think', which advocates first-degree entailments (FDE) for consequences in a database. However, if we take the domain approach to logical pluralism, then what becomes of this

motivation? Imagine there is a zoologist who is keeping track of various data about ring-tailed lemurs in a database, and assume that classical logic is the appropriate consequence property for the domain. Then, according to domain-specific logical pluralism, we cannot say that paraconsistent logic is the appropriate one for this database. The topic of the database is ring-tailed lemurs. That is a problem, but it goes away on the context approach.

Do not take these to be knockdown objections; they are not. For what it is worth, this is my view on the matter. I think that the context approach is better than the domain approach, but I do not think that what I have said here is conclusive by any means. It is just an indication of why I am using the context approach in what follows instead of the domain approach.

### 3 *Replacing Truth and Alethic Pluralism*

The standard way of thinking about alethic pluralism is to use the domain approach. Forget about that for a moment, and instead use the context approach to be alethic pluralist. If we pick the right truth properties—namely, the ones that I have advocated in recent work to replace the concept of truth—then one arrives at something very much like the view that I have been defending.<sup>10</sup> Hence, much to my surprise, I end up being an alethic pluralist of this sort based on my recent work. If you take the context not to be the context of utterance but rather the context of assessment because I am an assessment sensitivity theorist with respect to the truth predicate of natural language. In short, a context approach to pluralism about truth where there are only two truth properties—being ascending true and being descending true—and the relevant context is the context of assessment, looks a lot like the view I have been defending under a different guise.

Nevertheless, my account suffers from deficiencies due to the weakness of the resulting truth predicate. If the truth predicate of natural language has the features that I claim it has, then that truth predicate is weaker than it would be if it had instead the features that, say, Beall thinks it has.<sup>11</sup> Beall thinks the truth predicate of English obeys an unrestricted T-schema. I think it does not; I think the T-schema has exceptions.

Wouldn't it be nice to have a view that combines the best of both? Wouldn't it be nice if we could have a view that includes the benefits of the view that I advocate and the view that the deflationists advocate and none of the costs? Perhaps a more thoroughgoing pluralism can help! In the remainder, I attempt to formulate such a view then evaluate it with respect to current standards in the literature on the paradoxes associated with truth.

## 4 Coordinated Logical and Alethic Pluralism

Approaches to the alethic paradoxes that advocate stronger truth predicates tend to get paired with weaker logics. By 'stronger' I do not mean 'has a bigger extension'; by 'stronger' I mean 'satisfies more principles'. Approaches that have weaker truth predicates get paired with stronger logics. For example, my approach posits a weaker truth predicate but it is compatible with classical logic, which is strong.<sup>12</sup> Beall's approach posits a stronger truth predicate but it is not compatible classical logic. In the coordinated logical and alethic pluralism view—the current proposal—the truth predicate that is relevant in a particular context of utterance and the logical consequence predicate that is relevant in a particular context of utterance are coordinated in a way that avoids triviality but provides the optimal combination that you can have. Perhaps a coordinated logical and alethic pluralist could get the best of both worlds! Or so it might seem.

The proposal is to incorporate logical and alethic pluralism into a single approach to the alethic paradoxes. In this view, the two kinds of pluralism are *coordinated* because the logical pluralism and the alethic pluralism do not float free of one another. Instead, in a particular context of utterance, there is a parameter that determines both a truth property and a logical consequence property together.

What follows is not a familiar alethic pluralism because the relevant truth properties are inspired by approaches to the *alethic paradoxes*, not proposals for analyzing the *nature of truth*.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, what follows is not a familiar logical pluralism because the relevant validity properties are

inspired by approaches to the alethic paradoxes, not proposals for analyzing the *nature of logical consequence*.

The non-classical approaches to the alethic paradoxes advocate logics that are different from the standard logics at play in the discussion over which is the right logic. The discussion about which is the right logic typically is about classical logic, intuitionistic logic, or relevance logic (R—the strong one). But none of those work for non-classical approaches to the liar and the other paradoxes. One's logic must be far weaker than those if one is going to get a non-classical approach to paradoxes.<sup>14</sup> So when I talk about logical pluralism in this proposal, I am taking the options for your logical consequence relation are going to include a wide range of weak logics like BX or LP or substructural logics on where transitivity fails or contraction fails. It is hard to imagine any of these paradox-motivated non-classical logics would be appealing without thinking of them as solutions to the paradoxes.

Likewise, truth properties under consideration in this proposal are not correspondence, supercoherence, superassertibility; none of that. Instead, the truth properties are classical gappy truth, classical glutty truth, and various transparent or deflationary kinds of truth. Similarly, it is hard to imagine any of these paradox-motivated non-deflationary truth properties would be appealing without thinking of them as solutions to the paradoxes.

Although these are not the only combinations one could include in the coordinated pluralist view, the following are some examples:

- Classical logic and classical gappy truth
- Classical logic and classical glutty truth
- Classical logic and assessment-sensitive truth
- Weakly classical logic and revision theoretic truth
- Paracomplete logic and deflationary truth
- Paraconsistent logic and deflationary truth
- Non-transitive substructural logic and deflationary truth
- Non-contractive substructural logic and deflationary truth<sup>15, 16</sup>

In each case, 'deflationary truth' refers to a truth property that satisfies the T-schema, where the biconditional involved in the T-sentences is the



obvious one from the logic in question (e.g., in paracomplete logic, the T-sentences have the paracomplete biconditional; in BX, they have the BX biconditional; etc.).

This coordinated pluralist theory being presented entails that all alethic and logical expressions of natural language designate properties. Which property they designate depends on some parameter or variable. I use 'context' as a general term for what determines this parameter. One might be more specific about this model in various ways. For example, one might take the context to be a *context of utterance* and take it to determine the *contents* of the word 'true' and the logical expressions (e.g., 'and', 'or', 'if and only if', 'valid', 'entails'). This would be a standard *contextualist* view. Instead, one might take the context to be a *context of assessment* and take it to determine only the *extensions* of the truth predicate and the logical expressions. This would be a *semantic relativist* view.<sup>17</sup> Other variants are possible as well (e.g., non-indexical contextualism, and mixing options for distinct expressions).

## 5 Discussion

Objection: Context dependence is incompatible with alethic or logical pluralism. These views are competitors that cannot both be true.

My reply: The essence of pluralism is that something's extension or reference is sensitive in some way to its domain or its context or whatever. Contextualism is one way of interpreting any pluralism that utilizes the context approach. Non-indexical contextualism is another option too, as is assessment sensitivity. Each of these is a kind of extension-sensitivity. Hence, contextualists about truth are pluralists about truth (a truth property for every content of 'true'). Pluralists need not be contextualists, obviously; they could go with some other context-based semantic theory, the domain approach, or some other way to link the plurality of truth properties to the single word, 'true'.

Objection: The coordinated pluralist view is formulated as a kind of strong pluralism. What about *moderate* pluralisms? Could they have any role in a coordinated view?

Reply: I am not sure about this. We are dealing with paradoxes, so generalizing is risky. The issue with moderate pluralism is whether there is an ‘-as-such’ property that generalizes over the specific properties. The coordinated view could accept that there are truth properties that include *many* individuals covered by the specific truth properties.<sup>18</sup>

One question is whether there is an extension of ‘true’ that is the union of all the other extensions of ‘true’. If we include classical glut views (according to which T-Out fails), there might be lots of sentences in the extension of that truth predicate that cannot be ‘released’ (to use Beall’s terminology). They would be harmless. And that extension of ‘true’ might include everything that is in any other extension.

For example, consider a context where a paracomplete logic is appropriate and a deflationary truth property. Then excluded middle is not going to have the deflationary truth property in that context. Excluded middle is not compatible with a paracomplete logic and a deflationary notion of truth (assuming that liar sentences are in the language). So it seems to me that, at best, some contexts might have an ‘-as-such’ property for truth, and some might have an ‘-as-such’ property for logical consequence, but no context will have both. And there might very well be reasons to think that even this is not attainable.<sup>19</sup>

Objection: What determines which logic/truth pair is determined by a context? Wouldn’t there be just two contexts: the safe context where the paradoxes are not a threat and the dangerous context where the paradoxes are a threat?

My reply: It depends on how you set up the coordinated theory. There is no context in which both truth and logic behave intuitively. That would give us triviality. Instead, in different contexts the boundaries of truth and logic wander around the realm of the intuitive without ever encompassing all of it. One might take truth/logic combinations to be determined by the interests of those in the context. For example, if I want a reason about truths in a certain way, then I need to insure I am in a context where the truth property obeys the principle in question. If I want a reason in a slightly different way, I might shift contexts and have a different extension for my truth predicate so that it obeys some other principle. The same goes for the logic. For example, say I want to use

reasoning by cases. Then I should not be in contexts in which certain non-classical logics are operative. Instead, say I want to use modus ponens. I should not be in one of the contexts that determines the logic LP, which, notoriously, does not count modus ponens valid.

One final objection: Why would the logical and alethic features be aligned like this? It seems like some kind of preestablished harmony (in a pejorative sense).

My reply: Yes, it does seem rather convenient. However, the objection is only relevant if the coordinated view is a descriptive theory. It need not be; we can be conceptual engineers, who offer prescriptive views. We could say: forget about the way our language actually works and think of this as a proposal for how to reform it.<sup>20</sup>

## 6 Revenge

I have presented coordinated logical and alethic pluralism and defended it from a couple of obvious objections. However, there is a serious problem with it. I think it ultimately fails, and it fails because it does not do better on revenge paradox phenomena.

One of the most horrible things about working on the paradoxes associated with truth is the revenge problem. When a theorist offers a solution to the paradoxes, it turns out that the proposed solution itself gives rise to new paradoxes that are structurally identical to the liar paradox. And these new paradoxes determine that the proposed solution is inconsistent. The revenge phenomenon is extremely frustrating and it affects almost everybody in this literature.<sup>21</sup> I say ‘almost’ everybody because I claim it does not affect my own view. Whether I am right or not, if an approach to the alethic paradoxes does not do better on the revenge paradoxes, then that is a non-starter—one should not even bother with it.

In the coordinated pluralist view just presented, there are lots of revenge paradoxes. In particular, sentences like:

- (1) (1) is not just true
- (2) (2) is Xnot true

are associated with revenge paradoxes. Sentence (1) is a standard revenge paradox for the paraconsistent dialetheist. Reasoning that is parallel to the liar reasoning shows that if a paraconsistent language in question has a sentence like (1), then it is trivial.<sup>22</sup> Sentence (2) is a standard revenge paradox for the paracomplete theorist (the word ‘Xnot’ expresses exclusion negation, which is like kryptonite to the paracomplete theorist). Reasoning parallel to the liar also shows that if a paracomplete language has a sentence like (2), then it is trivial.

However, I do not think that either of these revenge paradoxes is a serious problem for the coordinated pluralist. Recall, the whole point of formulating the coordinated pluralist view is to combine the best of these approaches and avoid their faults. In the coordinated proposal, each context behaves like an entire language, and the meanings of the logical expressions and truth predicate shift around from context to context to avoid triviality anywhere. Let context 1 be where a paraconsistent logic is operative and context 2 be where a paracomplete logic is operative. In context 1, there simply are no resources to construct a sentence like (1)—the relevant expressions have contents that are determined in part so as to avoid this kind of triviality. In particular, there is no expression that would mean what ‘just’ would have to mean to derive a contradiction from reasoning about (1). Likewise, in context 2, there are no resources to construct a sentence like (2). In particular, there is no expression that would mean what ‘Xnot’ would have to mean to derive a contradiction. These kinds of expressive limitations are familiar ways that paraconsistent theorists and paracomplete theorists have developed to avoid these revenge paradoxes.

The whole point of the coordinated pluralist position is to avoid each specific expressive limitation by confining it to a particular context. If someone wants to use ‘just’ or ‘Xnot’, these resources are available in certain contexts, just not contexts in which there is available an incompatible truth predicate (i.e., a truth predicate that obeys principles that would lead to triviality). The coordinated pluralist can dodge worries about these expressive limitations because the limitations are local, not global. For any bit of vocabulary whatsoever, there is a context in which it is available. What is not available for the coordinated pluralist (or anyone else) are combinations of vocabularies that together lead to triviality.

In sum, the effects of well-known revenge paradoxes from (1) and (2) are mitigated by the coordinated pluralist view. That is exactly what it was designed to do.

However, there are big problems. We have lots of potential contexts of utterance and in each of them there is some non-trivial combination of logical expressions and a truth predicate.

Or, more accurately, we have a single language with context-dependent logical and alethic vocabulary. In each context of utterance, these expressions have particular contents, and in no context of utterance are the contents such as to entail triviality. Or so it seems.

So far we have been ignoring the language's ability to talk about what goes in different contexts of utterance. Of course, we have to be able to utilize these sorts of resources to even set up the coordinated pluralist theory. However, once we focus on expressions like 'context' and 'true in a context', we can see why they make trouble. For example, imagine in Context 1, the truth predicate has the content of a classical gappy truth predicate (i.e., it obeys T-Out, but not T-In) and the logical expressions are classical. In Context 2, the truth predicate has the content of a deflationary truth predicate and the logical expressions are paracomplete (e.g., Field's logic). In a conversation with Context 1, someone might utter a sentence:

(3) Sentence (4) is true.

Because we are dealing with multiple contexts, we can label this: Sentence (4) is true in Context 1. Here, 'true in Context 1' is just another name for the particular content 'true' has in Context 1.

In the same conversation, we might also get the following uttered:

(4) Sentence (4) is not true in Context 2.

Because sentence (4) is uttered in Context 1, if it has contained just a bare truth predicate ('true'), then this truth predicate would have had the same content as the predicate in (3), namely, the classical gappy content. But instead (4) has 'true in Context 2', which is not a classical gappy truth predicate. It is instead a deflationary truth predicate.

Now, still in Context 1, where classical logic is operative, someone could reason in the following way. Assuming (4) is true, we can use the T-schema for 'true in Context 2', together with facts about the identity of sentence (4) to derive a contradiction in the usual liar style. Each of the logical inferences is fine because Context 1 is classical.

What has gone wrong? We have used the resources needed to formulate the coordinated logical and alethic pluralist theory to construct a revenge paradox that the theory cannot handle.

In fact, we have shown how to 'import' a liar sentence from one context where it is harmless into another context where it results in triviality.

One might protest: just ban all terminology like 'true in a context'! This suggestion evidences two major confusions. First, the coordinated theory is supposed to avoid expressive limitations like this, so this sort of move isn't remotely plausible given the aims of the coordinated theory. Second, we are talking about natural language. You cannot ban parts of natural language. If we want an approach to the paradoxes that isn't just a mildly interesting toy, then we need to take all the resources of natural language seriously.

The revenge paradox associated with sentence (4) shows that, as it stands, coordinated pluralism is trivial and so unacceptable. Thus, our attempt to arrive at a better approach to the liar and other paradoxes affecting truth by being more pluralist has backfired. What happened? Why did it fail? The answer is that revenge paradoxes come in many forms, but they all utilize some tool or feature of an attempt to solve the alethic paradoxes. Some revenge paradoxes depend on what the approach says about the truth predicate. Others depend on what the approach says about logic. Still others depend on other elements of an approach, for example, the appeal to contexts. In the coordinated pluralist view I have been considering, each context encapsulates a particular combination of logic and truth. However, appealing to the tool of contexts to put all these combinations together into a single coordinated pluralist view is its undoing. The vocabulary used to describe the contexts, although not itself logical or alethic, can be exploited by a revenge paradox. Hence, particular revenge paradoxes for particular combinations of logic and truth predicate (e.g., sentences (1) and (2)) are not much of a threat to the coordinated pluralist. Instead, it is the revenge paradoxes that quantify over

contexts that pose the problem. To incorporate each one of the range of approaches to the paradoxes into a single view, we have appealed to contexts. But in so doing, we expose the coordinated view to a new kind of revenge paradox that is not a problem for any one of the particular approaches incorporated. It is the incorporation tools (i.e., the framework of contexts) that expose the coordinated view to revenge and, ultimately, triviality.

Given the revenge susceptibility of coordinated logical and alethic pluralism, it is better to stick with an approach that does not give rise to revenge paradoxes at all, even if that view has other costs related to the truth predicate. The attempt to do better by combining the good aspects of my view and the good aspects of other views like Beall's fails.

One might object: If there are revenge paradoxes on the coordinated view, why doesn't my own approach fall prey to them? The reason is that the two truth predicates that I advocate are specially designed to avoid revenge paradoxes, and they have to be *very* carefully designed to avoid it.

For example, I have argued that 'true' is assessment-sensitive, and that in situations where truth paradoxes abound, we ought to use new concepts, ascending truth and descending truth, instead of the concept of truth. Using these resources, we can construct sentences like

- (5) For all U, for all A, (4) is not ascending true in U from A.  
 (6) For all U, for all A, (5) is not descending true in U from A.

Here 'U' ranges over contexts of utterance and 'A' ranges over contexts of assessment. It is easy to show that for all U and for all A, (5) and (6) are ascending true in U from A and not descending true in U from A. There is nothing paradoxical or contradictory about this result. Indeed, ascending truth and descending truth have been designed to work together flawlessly in classical logic.<sup>23</sup>

When we appeal to contexts to coordinate truth and logic together, that very careful design is lost, and the result is that we get the revenge paradox. Appealing to contexts allows us to combine many logic/truth predicate combinations. But this very mechanism introduces a way of generating revenge paradoxes that need not be present in *any* of the specific contexts. Perhaps there are revenge-immune ways of putting together pairs of logics and truth predicates, but they don't seem obvious if they exist.

## 7 Conclusion

There are two different approaches to pluralism: the domain approach and the context approach. I have argued against the domain approach and in favor of the context approach. Moreover, the approach that I advocate for the paradoxes associated with truth can be understood as a kind of pluralism. Finally, trying to do better than my approach by merging many logic/truth combinations into a single pluralist view fails. The problem is that the pluralist mechanism itself provides the materials for revenge paradoxes.

## Notes

1. See Cook (2002), Beall and Restall (2006), Shapiro (2006, 2014), Russell (2008), and Field (2009).
2. Cr. Wright (1992, 2003), Lynch (2009), Pedersen (2010), Edwards (2011), Ulatowski (2017), and the papers in Pedersen and Wright (2013).
3. See Pedersen (2006), Cotnoir (2013b), Caret (2017), Yu (2017), and Stollo (2018) for discussion.
4. However, see Berto (2015).
5. See Cr. Wright (1992) and Lynch (2009) for examples of alethic pluralists appealing to domains, and see Beall and Restall (2006) and Shapiro (2014) for examples of logical pluralists appealing to contexts. Note that Beall and Restall are inconsistent on this matter: at (2006: 88) they deny that they appeal to contexts as part of their pluralism, but they explicitly do so throughout the book (2005, 69, 91, 94, 99, 116, 118). They also say that there are multiple ‘senses’ of words like ‘valid’ (2005, 29), which would suggest an ambiguity or context-dependence. See Hjortland (2015) and Caret (2017) for discussion.
6. See Pedersen (2014) and Kouri and Shapiro (2017) for example.
7. See Fantl and McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2003) and Stanley (2005).
8. See Cohen (1986), DeRose (1992), and Lewis (1996).
9. See Tappolet (1997).
10. See Scharp (2013).
11. Beall (2009).



12. Scharp (2013).
13. See Beall (2013b) and Cotnoir (2013a) for other examples.
14. For example, the T-Schema is inconsistent in intuitionistic logic (I) and in the logic of relevant implication (R).
15. See Scharp (2013) for assessment-sensitive, Ripley (2014) for non-transitive, and Zardini (2011) for non-contractive. See Field (2008) for the rest.
16. Remember that the deflationary truth predicates will have different extensions in different logics. Each one will have exactly the logical truths of that logic in its extension.
17. See MacFarlane (2014) on assessment sensitivity, Shapiro (2014) on assessment-sensitive logical expressions and Scharp (2014) on assessment-sensitive truth predicates.
18. See Cotnoir (2013a) for discussion.
19. Some combination views might include a classical glut property according to which (T-Out) fails; that is, in which the move from  $\langle P \text{ is true} \rangle$  to  $P$  fails. If so, we could stick a whole bunch of logical principles under that glut property without any of them being released. If we really want a context in which we could say that those logical principles are true, we could do that.
20. See Cappelen (2018) and Scharp (2013) for discussion.
21. See Beall (2008), Scharp (2013, 2014), and Bacon (2015) for discussion.
22. See Beall (2009, 2013a) and Scharp (2018).
23. See Scharp (2013: chap. 9).

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